Auctions and Market Design Online Seminar Series

About the Seminar

The aim of this interdisciplinary seminar is to discuss pioneering and impactful work in the broad area of market design. Theoretical, computational, and experimental work as well as field studies will be featured. A wide range of applications, ranging from online advertising and labor markets to networks and platforms, will be presented. The seminar features research talks and expository talks to highlight trends in the field.



The seminar is organized by Ozan Candogan (Chicago Booth), Vahideh Manshadi (Yale), and Fanyin Zheng (Columbia).

The seminar will be bi-weekly on Fridays at 1-2 pm ET (10-11 am PT).

Seminar link

Email List

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October 02 - Alvin Roth (Stanford University)
Title: Kidney Exchange: an Operations Perspective Abstract: Many patients in need of a kidney transplant have a willing but incompatible (or poorly matched) living donor. Kidney exchange programs arrange exchanges among such patient-donor pairs, in cycles and chains of exchange, so each patient receives a compatible kidney.  Kidney exchange has become a standard form of transplantation in  the  United  States  and  a  few  other  countries,  in  large  part  because  of  continued attention  to  the  operational  details  that  arose  as  obstacles  were  overcome  and  new obstacles became relevant. We review some of the key operational issues in the design of  successful  kidney  exchange  programs.  Kidney  exchange  has  yet  to  reach  its  full potential,  and  the  paper  further  describes  some  open  questions  that  we  hope  will continue to attract attention from researchers interested in the operational aspects of dynamic exchange.

October 16 - John Birge (University of Chicago)
Title: Increasing Efficiency in Electricity Market Auctions WjAlWy9xQkanvUuhXTWBAbstract: Electricity markets in much of the world are organized with day-ahead and real-time components for energy and in some place regular auctions of financial transmission rights that depend on the energy prices. The form of these organizations leads to a degree of inherent efficiency and instability due to misalignments of incentives. This talk will describe potential mechanisms for alleviating these inefficiencies including the inclusion of some form of stochastic clearing, flexibility in the forms of bids, and penalties for inefficiencies caused by speculative bidders.

October 30 - Jon Kleinberg (Cornell University)
Title: Fairness and Bias in Algorithmic Decision-Making Jon KleinbergAbstract: As algorithms trained via machine learning are increasingly used as a component of screening decisions in areas such as hiring, lending, and education, discussion in the public sphere has turned to the question of what it means for algorithmic classification to be fair to different groups. We consider several of the key fairness conditions that lie at the heart of these debates, and discuss recent research establishing inherent trade-offs between these conditions. We also explore how the complexity of a classification rule interacts with its fairness properties, showing how natural ways of approximating a classifier via a simpler rule can act in conflict with fairness goals. The talk will be based on joint work with Jens Ludwig, Sendhil Mullainathan, Manish Raghavan, and Cass Sunstein.

November 13 - Winners of the Michael H. Rothkopf Junior Researcher Paper Prize

December 04 - Asuman Ozdaglar (MIT)

December 18 - Matthew Jackson (Stanford University)