Workshop 2021

INFORMS Workshop on Market Design 2021
July 23-24, 2021

(in conjunction with the ACM EC 2021 conference)

The 3rd INFORMS workshop on market design is organized by the INFORMS Section on Auctions and Market Design in conjunction with the ACM EC 2021 conference. The workshop brings together researchers and also practitioners designing markets, developing algorithms and theory for multi-object markets with or without money. 

Market design is a field of applied and theoretical research that sits comfortably on the intersection of computer science, economics, and operations research. In recent decades, the theory and applications of market design have blossomed. In this workshop, we will focus on a set of promising, new applications of market design. In particular, we are interested in applications of market design which involve optimization with complex allocation constraints, vast datasets and machine learning, and dynamic pricing issues. We also want to explore problems which, despite receiving ample theoretical attention, have not been implemented in practice. We welcome theoretical and empirical papers that deal with new domains of market design as well as papers that discuss practical aspects of market design. Papers addressing applications and challenges in particular domains such as energy or environmental markets are particularly welcome. Topics include but are not limited to 

  • Machine learning in market design
  • Mathematical optimization in markets
  • Pricing and competitive equilibria in markets
  • Iterative multi-object auctions 
  • Matching with constraints and complex preferences
  • Dynamic/online mechanisms for selling goods over time
Our workshop is a two-day workshop with invited speakers and a sequence of submitted papers. We intend to build a program presenting current work in market design, so work that has not been achieved yet by the full paper appearing in some proceedings or accepted for publication in a journal. Due to time limitations, only a small number of papers will be accepted, so inevitably we expect that some high quality papers might be rejected. There will be no proceedings and no detailed reviews. All submissions will also have an option to be considered by the Algorithms, Computation and Economics Department of Naval Research Logistics, with those accepted for the workshop provided with the fast-track review process. 

Keynote speakers
  • To attend the workshop, please complete the registration hereThere is a single registration for all virtual events associated with EC. The registration fee for those registering by July 15 is $20 for ACM SIGecom members.

All times ET, substract 3 for PT, add 5 for UK, add 6 for CET, add 14 for Australia

Each block of accepted papers has two talks: 25 for each presentation, followed by 20min devoted to parallel discussion in Gather 

9:50 am

Workshop Opening

  • Martin Bichler, Sasa Pekec, Alex Teytelboym

10:00-10:50 am  Invited Talk 

Tommy Andersson (Lund University): House Allocation with Price Restrictions

10:50-12:00 am Session 

Dynamic Markets

  • Dynamic Spatial Matching
    • Yash Kanoria (Columbia Business School)*
  • Dynamic Pricing Provides Robust Equilibria in Stochastic Ride-Sharing Networks
    • Massey Cashore (Cornell University)*; Peter Frazier (Cornell University); Eva Tardos (Cornell University)

12:00-1:10 pm Session 


  • Multi-agent Assortment Optimization in Sequential Matching Markets
    • Margarida Carvalho (Université de Montréal); Andrea Lodi (Polytechnique Montréal); Alfredo Torrico (Polytechnique Montreal)*
  • When is Assortment Optimization Optimal?
    • Will Ma (Columbia University)*

1:10-2.00 pm  Invited Talk 

Wedad Elmaghraby (University of Maryland): Marketplace Expansion through Marquee Seller Adoption: The Role of Entrant Quality

2:00-3:10 pm Session 

Mechanism Design

  • Mechanism Design under Approximate Incentive Compatibility
    • Francisco Castro (UCLA Anderson School of Management)*
  • Redistributive Allocation Mechanisms
    • Mohammad Akbarpour (Stanford); Piotr Dworczak (Northwestern University); Scott Duke Kominers (Harvard University)*
PROGRAM Saturday

10:00-11:10 am Session 

Object allocation

  • The Vigilant Eating Rule: A General Approach for Probabilistic Economic Design with Constraints
    • Haris Aziz (UNSW Sydney)*; Florian Brandl (Bonn University)
    • Undergraduate Course Allocation through Pseudo-Markets
      • Daniel A Kornbluth (Carnegie Mellon University)*; Alexey Kushnir (Carnegie Mellon)

    11:10-12.00 am  Invited Talk 

    Asu Ozdaglar (MIT): Too Much Data: Prices and Inefficiencies in Data Markets

    12:00-1:10 pm Session 

    Market Design for Public Policy

    • Simple and Approximately Optimal Contract Design for Payment for Ecosystem Services
      • Wanyi Li (Stanford University); Itai Ashlagi (Stanford); Irene Lo (Stanford)*
      • School Assignment by Match Quality
        • Aram Grigoryan (Duke University)*; Atila Abdulkadiroglu (Duke University); Umut Dur (North Carolina State University)

      1:10-2:20 pm Session 

      Matching Theory

      • Shapley-Scarf Housing Markets: Respecting Improvement, Integer Programming, and Kidney Exchange
        • Peter Biro (Hungarian Academy of Sciences)*; Flip Klijn (CSIC and Barcelona GSE); Xenia Klimentova (INESC TEC); Ana Viana (INESC TEC and ISEP)
        • The Dichotomous Affiliate Stable Matching Problem: Approval-Based Matching with Applicant-Employer Relations
          • Marina L Knittel (University of Maryland, College Park)*; Samuel Dooley (University of Maryland); John P Dickerson (University of Maryland);