Workshop 2018

INFORMS Workshop on Mathematical Optimization in Market Design 2018

cosponsored by IBM Research

June 18-19, 2018, Gates Hall, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY
(co-located with ACM EC 2018)

=> Workshop program

Description
Mathematical optimization, in particular linear and integer linear programming, plays a central role in the design and analysis of multi-object markets and also provides a central foundation for theoretical models of multi-object markets. Algorithms for the solution of integer linear programs have seen substantial progress in the past two decades, allowing for totally new types of markets in different domains. While Leonid Kantorovich and Tjalling Koopmans received the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences for their work on linear programming and optimal resource allocation as early as 1975, the advances in more recent years have been staggering and have made many new markets possible that were not considered tractable just a few years ago. However, market design is more than just mathematical programming, as it takes into consideration bidding strategies and human behavior. Apart from the computational tractability and optimality of a market outcome, market designers try to satisfy properties such as stability, fairness, and incentive-compatibility. These properties combine to create interesting design problems in applications such as spectrum sales, supply-chain management, kidney exchanges, school choice, or course allocation.

The workshop brings together researchers and also practitioners designing markets, developing algorithms and theory for multi-object markets with or without money. Topics include but are not limited to 
  • Computational optimization in markets
  • Pricing in non-convex markets
  • Iterative multi-object auctions 
  • Matching with constraints and complex preferences
  • Dynamic/online mechanisms for selling goods over time
The workshop program has invited speakers from academia and industry including Larry Ausubel (Maryland), Itai Ashlagi (Stanford), Peter Cramton (Cologne), Scott Kominers (Harvard), Sébastien Lahaie (Google), Sasa Pekec (Duke), Tuomas Sandholm (CMU), and many more.

Please direct questions to Martin Bichler (bichler at in.tum.de).

Workshop Registration
Please register online before the event. The registration fee covers food and other expenses. Section members receive a discount of $20.

Click here, if you want to join the INFORMS Section on Auctions and Market Design ($10/year).

Date and Location
The workshop will take place on June 18 and 19, 2018 at the Bill and Melinda Gates Hall at Cornell University.

Local Accommodations

For your convenience, a small block of hotel rooms has been reserved for the workshop on June 18/19 at the Statler Hotel (first-come, first-served). For those attending the ACM EC conference, please visit the EC web page for information on the conference hotel. Alternative hotels near Cornell University are Marriott Downtown and The Hilton Garden Inn Downtown.

Schedule

June 18, 2018


8:00-8:30 am Registration and Breakfast


8:30-8:45 am 
Workshop Opening
Martin Bichler, Bob Day

8:45-9:30 am  Talk (Chair: Martin Bichler)
Solving Large Incomplete-Information Extensive-Form Games, and Beating the Top Human Professionals at Heads-Up No-Limit Texas Hold'em
Tuomas Sandholm, Carnegie Mellon University

9:30-9:45 am Coffee Break

9:45-11:15 am Session (Chair: Bob Day)
Optimization and Pricing in Non-Convex Markets

Allocation Under Stochastic Demand: A Primal-Dual Approach
Sasa Pekec, Duke University

Competitive Equilibria in Combinatorial Exchanges with Financially Constrained Buyers
Stefan Waldherr, Technical University of Munich (with Martin Bichler)

Linear Prices in Combinatorial Auctions
Bob Day, University of Connecticut

11:15-11:30 am Coffee Break
 
11:30-1:00 pm Session (Chair: Ben Lubin)
Iterative Combinatorial Auctions

An Efficient Ascending Auction for Private Valuations
Oleg Baranov, University of Colorado

Adaptive-Price Combinatorial Auctions
Sebastien Lahaie, Google (with Ben Lubin, Boston University)

Machine Learning-Based Combinatorial Auctions
Ben Lubin, Boston University (with Sven Seuken and Gianluca Brero, Zurich University)

1:00-2:00 pm Lunch Break

2:00-3:00 pm Session (Chair: Itai Ashlagi)
Matching with Constraints and Complex Preferences

Hidden Substitutes
Scott Kominers, Harvard Business School

Clearing Matching Markets Efficiently: Informative Signals and Match Recommendations
Itai Ashlagi, Stanford University

3:00-3:10 pm Break

3:10-4:30 pm Panel Discussion
Beyond Strategyproofness
Panel Chair: Martin Bichler, Technical Univ. of Munich 
Panelists: Eric Budish, Univ. of Chicago; Peter Cramton, Cologne Univ.; Michal Feldman, Tel-Aviv Univ.

4:30-4:40 pm Coffee Break

4:40-5:30 pm Talk (Chair: Ben Lubin)
Markets for Road Use: Eliminating Congestion through Scheduling, Routing, and Real-time Road Pricing,
Peter Cramton, Cologne University (with R. Richard Geddes and Axel Ockenfels)

6 pm Joint Reception with ACM EC at the Gates Hall

June 19, 2018

9:00-10:30 am ACM EC Opening Session and Keynote
  
10:30-12:00 noon Session (Chair: Thayer Morrill)
Market Models and Applications

Quantity Contingent Auctions and Allocation of Airport Slots 
Michael Ball, University of Maryland

Prophet Inequalities Made Easy: Stochastic Optimization by Pricing Non-Stochastic Inputs
Michal Feldman, Tel-Aviv University

Family Ties:  Incorporating Siblings into School Choice
Thayer Morrill, NCSU

12:00-12:10 pm Break

12:10-12:55 pm Talk (Chair: Thayer Morrill)
Market Design and the FCC Incentive Auction
Larry Ausubel, University of Maryland  (with Christina Aperjis and Oleg Baranov)