Workshop 2022

INFORMS Workshop on Market Design 2022
University of Colorado, Boulder
July 15, 2022

(in conjunction with the ACM EC 2022 conference)

The 4th INFORMS workshop on market design is organized by the INFORMS Section on Auctions and Market Design in conjunction with the ACM EC 2022 conference. The workshop brings together researchers and also practitioners designing markets, developing algorithms and theory for multi-object markets with or without money. 

Market design is a field of applied and theoretical research that sits comfortably on the intersection of computer science, economics, and operations research. In recent decades, the theory and applications of market design have blossomed. In this workshop, we will focus on a set of promising, new applications of market design. In particular, we are interested in applications of market design which involve optimization with complex allocation constraints, vast datasets and machine learning, and dynamic pricing issues. We also want to explore problems which, despite receiving ample theoretical attention, have not been implemented in practice. We welcome theoretical and empirical papers that deal with new domains of market design as well as papers that discuss practical aspects of market design. Papers addressing applications and challenges in particular domains such as energy or environmental markets are particularly welcome. Topics include but are not limited to 

  • Machine learning in market design
  • Mathematical optimization in markets
  • Pricing and competitive equilibria in markets
  • Iterative multi-object auctions 
  • Matching with constraints and complex preferences
  • Dynamic/online mechanisms for selling goods over time
The one-day workshop will be held in person at the University of Colorado, Boulder. The workshop will feature invited speakers and a sequence of submitted papers. We intend to build a program presenting current work in market design, so work that has not been achieved yet by the full paper appearing in some proceedings or accepted for publication in a journal. Due to time limitations, only a small number of papers will be accepted, so inevitably we expect that some high quality papers might be rejected. There will be no proceedings and no detailed reviews. All submissions will also have an option to be considered by the Algorithms, Computation and Economics Department of Naval Research Logistics, with those accepted for the workshop provided with the fast-track review process. 

  • Submission Deadline: June 1, 2022, 11:59pm PDT
  • Notification: June 20, 2022
  • Workshop Date: July 15, 2022 
  • To attend the workshop, please complete the registration here. Note there is an option for workshop day registration only. 

Workshop Program   
(July 15, MDT)

8:50am   Workshop opening

9:00-10:10am   Applications of market design

  • Aggregating Distributed Energy Resources: Efficiency and Market Power
    • Zuguang Gao (University of Chicago Booth School of Business)*; Khaled Alshehri (King Fahd University of Petroleum and Minerals); John Birge (University of Chicago Booth School of Business)
  • Choice, Welfare, and Market Design: An Empirical Investigation of Feeding America's Choice System
    • Sam M Altmann (University of Oxford)*

10:10-11:10am   Invited Talk 

  • Fanyin Zheng (Columbia University): Private vs. Pooled Transportation: Customer Preference and Design of Green Transport Policy


11:20am-12:30pm   Mechanism design 

  • Adaptive Priority Mechanisms
    • Oguzhan Celebi (MIT)*; Joel Flynn (MIT)
  • Beckmann's Approach to Multi-item Multi-bidder Auctions
    • Alexander Kolesnikov (HSE), Fedor Sandomirskiy (Caltech)*,  Aleh Tsyvinski (Yale University) Alexander P. Zimin (HSE)

12:30-1:30pm   Lunch break

1:30-2:30pm   Invited Talk 

  • Marzena Rostek (University of Wisconsin-Madison): Decentralized-Market Design

Complex market design

  • Dynamic Learning in Large Matching Markets
    • Anand Kalvit (Columbia University)*; Assaf Zeevi (Columbia University)
  • Machine Learning-powered Course Allocation
    • Soumalias (University of Zurich); Behnoosh Zamanlooy (University of Zürich)*; Sven Seuken (University of Zurich); Jakob Weissteiner (University of Zurich)

3.40-3:50pm   Break

3:50:5:00pm   Information and decisions

  • Self-Explanatory Strategyproof Mechanisms 
    • Yannai A. Gonczarowski (Harvard University); Ori Heffetz (Cornell University); Clayton Thomas (Princeton University)*
  • Constrained School Choice with Incomplete Information
    • Hugo Gimbert (CNRS, Labri), Claire Mathieu (CNRS, IRIF), Simon Mauras (Tel Aviv University)