INFORMS Workshop on Market Design 2019
June 28, 2019 in Phoenix, AZ
(in conjunction with the
ACM EC 2019 conference)
This year's INFORMS workshop on market design will be organized by the INFORMS Section on Auctions and Market Design in conjunction with the ACM EC 2019 conference. The workshop brings together researchers and also practitioners designing markets, developing algorithms and theory for multi-object markets with or without money. The workshop is a successor of the 2018 INFORMS Workshop on Mathematical Optimization in Market Design and the 2018 Workshop on Frontiers in Market Design.
Market design is a field of applied and theoretical research that sits comfortably on the intersection of computer science, economics, and operations research. In recent decades, the theory and applications of market design have blossomed. In this workshop, we will focus on a set of promising, new applications of market design. In particular, we are interested in applications of market design which involve optimization with complex allocation constraints, vast datasets and machine learning, and dynamic pricing issues. We also want to explore problems which, despite receiving ample theoretical attention, have not been implemented in practice. We welcome theoretical and empirical papers that deal with new domains of market design as well as papers that discuss practical aspects of market design. Papers addressing applications and challenges in particular domains such as energy or environmental markets are particularly welcome. Topics include but are not limited to
- Machine learning in market design
- Mathematical optimization in markets
- Pricing and competitive equilibria in markets
- Iterative multi-object auctions
- Matching with constraints and complex preferences
- Dynamic/online mechanisms for selling goods over time
Our workshop is a one-day workshop with invited speakers, panels, and a sequence of submitted papers. Due to time limitations, we are going to accept a small number of papers so inevitably we expect that we will have to reject also high quality papers. Invited talks will be given by
Authors interested in this workshop might also be interested in an upcoming special issue on
Market Design and Analytics of the INFORMS Information Systems Research journal and the new department for
Revenue Management and Market Analytics at
Management Science.
Organizers
Schedule
- Submission Deadline: May 6, 2019, 11:59pm PDT.
- Notification: May 20, 2019
- Workshop Date: June 28, 2019
PROGRAM
8:00-8:40 am Registration and Breakfast
8:40-8:50 am
Workshop Opening
- Martin Bichler, Bob Day, Alex Teytelboym
8:50-9:30 am Invited Talk
Dirk Bergemann (Yale University): Progressive Participation
9:30-9:40 am Coffee Break
9:40-11:00 am Session (Chair: Teytelboym)
Online Markets
- Driver Surge Pricing
- Nikhil Garg (Stanford University)*; Hamid Nazerzadeh (USC Marshall)
- Dispatching through pricing: modeling ride-sharing markets and designing dynamic prices
- Mengjing Chen (Tsinghua University)*; Weiran Shen (Tsinghua University); Pingzhong Tang (Tsinghua University); Song Zuo (Google)
- Adversarial Bandits with Knapsacks
- Nicole Immorlica (Microsoft Research New England); Karthik Abinav Sankararaman (University of Maryland College)*; Robert Schapire (Microsoft); Alex Slivkins (Microsoft Research)
- Waiting time vs. mismatch in the online assignment game
- Panayotis Mertikopoulos (CNRS); Heinrich Nax (ETH Zurich); Bary Pradelski (CNRS)*
11:00-11:20 am Break
11:20 am -12:30 pm FCRC Keynote: Eric Lindahl (Stockholm University)
12:30-2.00 pm Lunch Break
2:00 pm - 2:40 pm Session (Chair: Bichler)
Matching Markets
- Enabling Trade-offs in Machine Learning-based Matching for Refugee Resettlement
- Nils Olberg (University of Zurich)*; Stefania Ionescu (University of Zurich); Jakob Weissteiner (Computations and Economics Research Group, University of Zurich); Sven Seuken (University of Zurich)
- Deferred Acceptance and Regret-Free Truth-telling
- Marcelo Ariel Fernandez (Johns Hopkins University)*
2:40-2.50 pm Break
2:50-3:30 pm Session (Chair: Day)
Scrip and lotteries
- Scrip Economies are (Approximately) Fair and Efficient
- Artur Gorokh (Cornell University)*; Krishnamurthy Iyer (Cornell University); Siddhartha Banerjee (Cornell University)
- k-Ticket Lotteries: Insights From Alaska
- Timothy W Randolph (Columbia University)*; Nick Arnosti (Columbia University)
3:30-3.50 pm Break
3:50-4:30 pm Invited Talk
Kevin Leyton-Brown (University of British Columbia): A Second Look at the Incentive Auction Design
4:30-5:10 pm Session (Chair: Lubin)
Data Markets
- Simple and Optimal Mechanisms for Selling Information to Budget-Constrained Buyers
- Yiling Chen (Harvard University); Haifeng Xu (Harvard University); Shuran Zheng (Harvard University)*
- How to Sell a Dataset? Pricing Policies for Data Monetization
- Sameer Mehta (The University of Texas at Dallas)*; Milind Dawande (The University of Texas at Dallas); Ganesh Janakiraman (The University of Texas at Dallas); Vijay Mookerjee (The University of Texas at Dallas)
5:10-5:20 pm Break
5.20pm-6:00 pm Session (Chair: Morrill)
Revenue Maximization
- The Sample Complexity of Up-to-ε Multi-Dimensional Revenue Maximization
- Yannai A. Gonczarowski (Tel Aviv University)*; S. Matthew Weinberg (Princeton University)
- A General Theory of Sample Complexity for Multi-Item Profit Maximization
- Maria-Florina Balcan (Carnegie Mellon University); Tuomas Sandholm (Carnegie Mellon University); Ellen Vitercik (Carnegie Mellon University)*