Workshop 2019

INFORMS Workshop on Market Design 2019
June 28, 2019 in Phoenix, AZ

(in conjunction with the ACM EC 2019 conference)

This year's INFORMS workshop on market design will be organized by the INFORMS Section on Auctions and Market Design in conjunction with the ACM EC 2019 conference. The workshop brings together researchers and also practitioners designing markets, developing algorithms and theory for multi-object markets with or without money. The workshop is a successor of the 2018 INFORMS Workshop on Mathematical Optimization in Market Design and the 2018 Workshop on Frontiers in Market Design.

Market design is a field of applied and theoretical research that sits comfortably on the intersection of computer science, economics, and operations research. In recent decades, the theory and applications of market design have blossomed. In this workshop, we will focus on a set of promising, new applications of market design. In particular, we are interested in applications of market design which involve optimization with complex allocation constraints, vast datasets and machine learning, and dynamic pricing issues. We also want to explore problems which, despite receiving ample theoretical attention, have not been implemented in practice. We welcome theoretical and empirical papers that deal with new domains of market design as well as papers that discuss practical aspects of market design. Papers addressing applications and challenges in particular domains such as energy or environmental markets are particularly welcome. Topics include but are not limited to 

  • Machine learning in market design
  • Mathematical optimization in markets
  • Pricing and competitive equilibria in markets
  • Iterative multi-object auctions 
  • Matching with constraints and complex preferences
  • Dynamic/online mechanisms for selling goods over time
Our workshop is a one-day workshop with invited speakers, panels, and a sequence of submitted papers. Due to time limitations, we are going to accept a small number of papers so inevitably we expect that we will have to reject also high quality papers. Invited talks will be given by

Authors interested in this workshop might also be interested in an upcoming special issue on Market Design and Analytics of the INFORMS Information Systems Research journal and the new department for Revenue Management and Market Analytics at Management Science.

Organizers
Schedule
  • Submission Deadline: May 6, 2019, 11:59pm PDT.
  • Notification: May 20, 2019
  • Workshop Date: June 28, 2019


Tentative Program


8:00-8:40 am Registration and Breakfast

8:40-8:50 am

Workshop Opening

Martin Bichler, Bob Day, Alex Teytelboym

8:50-9:30 am  Invited Talk 

Dirk Bergemann, Yale University


9:30-9:40 am Coffee Break


9:40-11:00 am Session 

Online Markets


Driver Surge Pricing

Nikhil Garg (Stanford University)*; Hamid Nazerzadeh (USC Marshall)


Dispatching through pricing: modeling ride-sharing markets and designing dynamic prices

Mengjing Chen (Tsinghua University)*; Weiran Shen (Tsinghua University); Pingzhong Tang (Tsinghua University); Song Zuo (Google)


Adversarial Bandits with Knapsacks

Nicole Immorlica (Microsoft Research New England); Karthik Abinav Sankararaman (University of Maryland College)*; Robert Schapire (Microsoft); Alex Slivkins (Microsoft Research)


Waiting time vs. mismatch in the online assignment game

Panayotis Mertikopoulos (CNRS); Heinrich Nax (ETH Zurich); Bary Pradelski (CNRS)*


11:00-11:20 am Break


11:20 am -12:30 pm FCRC Keynote


12:30-2.00 pm Lunch Break

2:00 pm - 2:40 pm Session 

Matching Markets


Enabling Trade-offs in Machine Learning-based Matching for Refugee Resettlement

Nils Olberg (University of Zurich)*; Stefania Ionescu (University of Zurich); Jakob Weissteiner (Computations and Economics Research Group, University of Zurich); Sven Seuken (University of Zurich)


Deferred Acceptance and Regret-Free Truth-telling

Marcelo Ariel Fernandez (Johns Hopkins University)*


2:40-2.50 pm Break


2:50-3:30 pm Session 

Scrip and lotteries

Scrip Economies are (Approximately) Fair and Efficient

Artur Gorokh (Cornell University)*; Krishnamurthy Iyer (Cornell University); Siddhartha Banerjee (Cornell University)


k-Ticket Lotteries: Insights From Alaska

Timothy W Randolph (Columbia University)*; Nick Arnosti (Columbia University)


3:30-3.50 pm Break


3:50-4:30 pm Invited Talk 

Kevin Leyton-Brown


4:30-5:10 pm Session 

Data Markets


Simple and Optimal Mechanisms for Selling Information to Budget-Constrained Buyers

Yiling Chen (Harvard University); Haifeng Xu (Harvard University); Shuran Zheng (Harvard University)*


How to Sell a Dataset? Pricing Policies for Data Monetization

Sameer Mehta (The University of Texas at Dallas)*; Milind Dawande (The University of Texas at Dallas); Ganesh Janakiraman (The University of Texas at Dallas); Vijay Mookerjee (The University of Texas at Dallas)


5:10-5:20 pm Break


5.20pm-6:00 pm Session 

Revenue Maximization


The Sample Complexity of Up-to-ε Multi-Dimensional Revenue Maximization

Yannai A. Gonczarowski (Tel Aviv University)*; S. Matthew Weinberg (Princeton University)


A General Theory of Sample Complexity for Multi-Item Profit Maximization

Maria-Florina Balcan (Carnegie Mellon University); Tuomas Sandholm (Carnegie Mellon University); Ellen Vitercik (Carnegie Mellon University)*