INFORMS Workshop on Mathematical Optimization in Market Design
cosponsored by IBM ResearchJune 18-19, 2018, Gates Hall, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY
(co-located with ACM EC 2018
=> Workshop programDescription
Mathematical optimization, in particular linear and integer linear programming, plays a central role in the design and analysis of multi-object markets and also provides a central foundation for theoretical models of multi-object markets. Algorithms for the solution of integer linear programs have seen substantial progress in the past two decades, allowing for totally new types of markets in different domains. While Leonid Kantorovich and Tjalling Koopmans received the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences for their work on linear programming and optimal resource allocation as early as 1975, the advances in more recent years have been staggering and have made many new markets possible that were not considered tractable just a few years ago. However, market design is more than just mathematical programming, as it takes into consideration bidding strategies and human behavior. Apart from the computational tractability and optimality of a market outcome, market designers try to satisfy properties such as stability, fairness, and incentive-compatibility. These properties combine to create interesting design problems in applications such as spectrum sales, supply-chain management, kidney exchanges, school choice, or course allocation.
The workshop brings together researchers and also practitioners designing markets, developing algorithms and theory for multi-object markets with or without money. Topics include but are not limited to
The workshop program has invited speakers from academia and industry including Larry Ausubel (Maryland), Itai Ashlagi (Stanford), Peter Cramton (Cologne), Scott Kominers (Harvard), Sébastien Lahaie (Google), Sasa Pekec (Duke), Tuomas Sandholm (CMU), and many more
- Computational optimization in markets
- Pricing in non-convex markets
- Iterative multi-object auctions
- Matching with constraints and complex preferences
- Dynamic/online mechanisms for selling goods over time
Please direct questions to Martin Bichler (bichler at in.tum.de).Workshop Registration
Please register online
before the event. The registration fee covers food and other expenses. Section members receive a discount of $20.
, if you want to join the INFORMS Section on Auctions and Market Design ($10/year).Date and Location
The workshop will take place on June 18 and 19, 2018 at the Bill and Melinda Gates Hall at Cornell University.
For your convenience, a small block of hotel rooms has been reserved for the workshop on June 18/19 at the Statler Hotel (first-come, first-served). For those attending the ACM EC conference, please visit the EC web page for information on the conference hotel. Alternative hotels near Cornell University are Marriott Downtown and The Hilton Garden Inn Downtown.
Cluster on Auctions and Market Design at the INFORMS Annual Meeting
The section is sponsoring the Auctions and Market Design cluster at the INFORMS Annual Meeting in Phoenix
. The cluster has been organized for more than 15 years.