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Cluster :
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eBusiness
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Session Information
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: Monday Oct 15, 08:00 - 09:30
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Title:
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Contracts and Pricing in Information Systems
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Chair:
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Shivendu Shivendu,University of California-Irvine, Irvine CA, United States of America, sshivend@uci.edu
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Abstract Details
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Title:
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Store Brands and Channel Power
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Presenting Author:
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Ruixia Shi,Assistant Professor, University of Richmond, Robins School of Business, 28 Westhampton Way, Richmond VA 23229, United States of America, rshi@richmond.edu
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Co-Author:
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Jun Ru,Assistant Professor, SUNY-Buffalo, 326D Jacobs Management Center, Buffalo NY 14260, United States of America, junru@buffalo.edu
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Jun Zhang,The University of Texas at Dallas, 800 W. Campbell Rd., Richardson TX, United States of America, jun.zhang@utdallas.edu
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Abstract:
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This paper relates a retailer’s store brand strategy to the relative bargaining powers of channel members. It shows that the store brand becomes less appealing to the retailer and the quality threshold for the store brand to be introduced becomes higher as power shifts from a manufacturer to a retailer.
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Title:
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When is Bundling of Contracts Optimal?
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Presenting Author:
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Qiang Zeng,Shantou University, Business School, Guangdong, China, qzeng@stu.edu.cn
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Co-Author:
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Shivendu Shivendu,University of California-Irvine, Irvine CA, United States of America, sshivend@uci.edu
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Abstract:
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When contracting out a series of sequential activities in which the quality of outcome of earlier activities impacts the cost to the vendor of the subsequent activities, the firm may offer unbundled contracts wherein she contracts for each activity separately and potentially with two different vendors, or offer bundled contracts to one single vendor for both activities. We study the tradeoffs and examine the optimality of bundling contracts under information asymmetry and uncertainty.
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Title:
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Why Consumers Pay High Prices for Software in China?
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Presenting Author:
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Zhe Zhang,University of California Irvine, Business School, Irvine CA, United States of America, zhez1@uci.edu
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Co-Author:
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Shivendu Shivendu,University of California-Irvine, Irvine CA, United States of America, sshivend@uci.edu
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Abstract:
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Software companies adopt heterogeneous product-pricing strategies across different countries. We observe that often software companies’ prices of versions are uncorrelated with per-capita income levels and piracy rates. Microsoft Office Business and Office Professional versions are priced much higher in China compared to in US. We unravel this puzzle in our model that the market consists of consumers who are heterogeneous on taste for quality of additional functionality and propensity to pirate.
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Title:
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Service Systems with Postponable Acceptance and Assignment
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Presenting Author:
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Keumseok Kang,Florida International University, 11200 SW 8th Street, Miami FL 33199, United States of America, kskang@fiu.edu
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Co-Author:
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Kemal Altinkemer,Purdue Universtiy, 403 West State Street, West Lafayette 47907, United States of America, Kemal@purdue.edu
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George Shanthikumar,Purdue University, 403 W. State Street, West Lafayette IN 47907, United States of America, shanthikumar@purdue.edu
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Abstract:
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We study the dynamic order acceptance and assignment problem for a service system that provides heterogeneous services using heterogeneous servers. Unlike traditional problems, in our settings, the service system can strategically postpone acceptance and assignment decisions for orders. We formulate this problem using a dynamic and stochastic programming approach, find the structural properties of the optimal policy, propose approximate policies, and conduct extensive computational experiments.
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