About AMD

About Auction and Market Design

Many problems in Operations Research and the Management Sciences are concerned with the allocation of scarce resources. In a networked economy, such problems typically involve multiple decision makers. Economic mechanisms such as auctions and matching markets are being used to solve distributed resource allocation problems, and the theory and practice in this field has been strongly influenced by techniques from Operations Research and the Management Sciences. The field is referred to as market design with multi-object auctions and matching markets as primary applications of interest. Market design is concerned with the design of real-world markets, and it considers the properties of alternative mechanisms, in terms of efficiency, fairness, incentives, and complexity. It brings together theoretical, empirical, and experimental methods, with an aim of studying relevant tradeoffs for policy makers or managers.

Board

Paul Milgrom, Stanford 
Karla Hoffman, George Mason University
Gabriel Weintraub, Stanford
Itai Ashlagi, Stanford
Sasha Pekec, Duke
Tuomas Sandholm, Carnegie Mellon University