

Designing Response Supply Chain Against Bioattacks

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Recipients of the 2020 Koopman Prize



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
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- MAS seeks to foster the development, dissemination, and implementation of knowledge, basic and applied research, and science and technologies that improve the understanding and execution of military and security operations.
- The society is planning its next major forums wherein analysts may participate, learn, and develop, either as attendees, presenters, or session coordinators.
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 - ❖ Learn about others' approaches to related challenges and applications
- ✓ Increase your domain knowledge
- ✓ Earn recognition

Koopman Prize



This is a \$500 award for the best published paper or report on military operations research topics directly related to the goals of MAS. The award honors the memory of Bernard Koopman (1900-1981), who was a pioneer in the field of operations research. He was active in the founding of the Operations Research Society of America (ORSA), later merged with TIMS to form INFORMS, and served as its president in 1956. Dr. Koopman served as an operations research liaison between the U.S. Department of Defense and United Kingdom military establishments and NATO, and played a critical role in making operations research a permanent NATO activity.

Koopman Prize Winner

**Volume 67,
Issue 5**

September-October
2019

Pages ii-iv, 1209-1502

Designing Response Supply Chain Against Bioattacks

<https://pubsonline.informs.org/doi/10.1287/opre.2019.1862>

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Designing Response Supply Chain Against Bio-attacks

Peter Zhang

Assistant Professor, Carnegie Mellon University

Koopman Prize Presentation, MAS Webinar

Dec 3, 2020

In collaboration with Profs. David Simchi-Levi and Nikos Trichakis

What is Bio-attack?



Intentional release of pathogens against humans to cause illness/death

- Small quantity affects large population




What is Bio-attack?

- Short treatment window
- E.g., anthrax



ADRIAN HOLOVATY/Missourian

Survivability



Bio-defense Strategies


State and Local Readiness

State and Local Readiness

PHEP Cooperative Agreement	+
Medical Countermeasure Readiness	-
Cities Readiness Initiative	
Emergency Response Funding	+
Tools and Resources	+

[Center for Preparedness and Response](#) > [State and Local Readiness](#) > [Medi](#)

Medical Countermeasure Readiness



(CDC 2012): Modeling activities should be increased substantially . . . An end-to-end model capturing the flow . . . as well as costs . . . and health measures, should begin at the . . . inventory site and go all the way to the point of dispensing . . . to the public.

Supply Chain Decisions

MCM = medical countermeasure

	Pre-Attack (Stage 1)	Attack	Post-Attack (Stage 2)
Federal Stockpiles	MCM Quantity		
Regional Stockpiles	MCM Quantity		
Shipment			Routing ²
Points of Dispense	Capacity, layout ¹		Operations ^{1,2,3}
USPS Dispense	Capacity		Deployment ³
Households	Home medical kits	Demand ⁴	Antibiotic efficacy ^{2,3}

¹ Hupert et al. (2009), Lee et al. (2006, 2006, 2009, 2009)

² King and Muckstadt (2009, 2012), Bravata et al. (2006)


³ Craft et al. (2005), Wein et al. (2003)

⁴ Berman and Gavious (2007)

Our Contributions

Quantitative design of responsive supply chain, to minimize impact from demand shock

Model	Integrative model with tractable solution heuristic
Theory	Optimality of solution approach
Case Study	Prepositioning antibiotics against anthrax attacks



Demand Loss Function $g(d)$

$$g(d) = \left\{ \begin{array}{ll} \min_{f(d), s(d) \geq 0} \sum_j s_j(d) & \text{Total demand loss} \\ \text{s.t. } s_j(d) \geq d_j - \sum_i f_{ij}(d) & \text{Flow balance} \\ x_i \geq \sum_j f_{ij}(d) & \end{array} \right\}$$

$g(d)$ is a nonlinear function of d

For exposition: we suppress dependence on x, u and flow-related cost such as treatment delays.

Demand Scenario Set \mathcal{D}

- Prop

Division of Strategic National Stockpile (DSNS) Program Review

- La

A Report from the Board of Scientific Counselors (BSC)

- Attacker ≠ nature

- Policymakers: “attacker has limited resources”

- Often seeking **along with the requirement of having to**

respond to simultaneous events in three cities, how much material

hour 12 after making a request, is the current hub-and-spoke model adequate for responding to a Cities Readiness Initiative (CRI) event?

- 2) If the community can begin using material at 3, 6, or 9 hours after making a request, and taking into account the 72 CRI cities and their populations, along with the requirement of having to respond to simultaneous events in three cities, how much material should be forward deployed and in what locations in order to support this type of programmatic change, if it were deemed beneficial?
- 3) What are the pros and cons associated with the procurement of additional inventory, storage locations, and manpower that would be needed to manage the storage locations, perform annual inventories, and provide security, and the potential need for movement of material from multiple locations to one location where it would be needed?
- 4) Would there be other more efficient alternatives to the hub-and-spoke model in a CRI event?

Overall Two-Stage Model

Defender decision	Attacker decision	Loss
$(x, u) \in X$	$d \in \mathcal{D}$	$g(d)$

$$\min_{(x,u) \in X} \max_{d \in \mathcal{D}} g(d)$$

- Robust optimization literature: two-stage robust optimization or adjustable robust optimization
- Military and security literature: defender-attacker-defender framework

Existing Solution Approaches



$$\min_{(x,u) \in X} \max_{d \in \mathcal{D}} g(d)$$

- Overall decision problem: intractable
 - Atamturk and Zhang (2007)
- Exact methods: 100 to 1,000-node network
 - Atkinson (2009), Alderson et al. (2015), Lazzaro (2016)
- National bio-defense: >100,000-node network

Our Solution Approach

$$\min_{(x,u) \in X} \max_{d \in \mathcal{D}} g(d)$$


- Treat it as **single-stage nonlinear** robust optimization
- Approximate $g(d)$ affine $f(d)$ and $s(d)$ to reformulate it as **linear** robust optimization
 - Affinely adjustable robust counterpart is tractable, Ben-tal et al. (2004)




Optimality of Our Approach

Theorem


If the network is a tree, then affine approximation is precise, and tractable.



Key Element in Proof






sum of envelopes = envelope of sum



Counter Example

- In general

Sum of envelopes \neq Envelope of sum




Performance on General Networks



5000 random instances

Solution method	Solved (4-hour limit)	Generated Lower Bound	Average Run Time
Affine	100%	-	6 seconds
Exact	2%	91%	3.9 hours

Gap Between Affine and Lower Bound





Case Study: Prepositioning Against Anthrax Attacks



(b) Incremental costs and deaths averted

Data Calibration

MCM = medical countermeasure






	Pre-Attack	Attack	Post-Attack (Stage 2)
Federal Stockpiles			
Regional Stockpiles			
Shipment			
Points of Dispense			
USPS Dispense			
Population			

H

its


Increasing Marginal Cost

Cost
Million \$ / Year




Value of Early Deployment

Cost (Million \$ / Year)



Value of Different Delivery Modes

Cost (Million \$ / Year)



Summary

- End-to-end modeling of inventory and capacity design for a responsive supply chain
- Provably optimal and tractable solution technology
- Direct application to modeling prepositioning strategies for anthrax attacks

- Connecting several streams of literature:
 - Public health OR
 - Military and security
 - Robust optimization
 - Nonlinear optimization

Follow-up Work

- Theory
 - Generalization of several results in the robust optimization literature from 2016 – Current
- Applications
 - Robust classification: robust nonlinear optimization with explicit summation structure
 - Designing resilient social network: defender-attacker-defender problem on a network

Thank You!

- Collaborators
- MAS Society
- Koopman Prize Committee

Paper available:

David Simchi-Levi, Nikolaos Trichakis, Peter Yun Zhang (2019) Designing Response Supply Chain Against Bioattacks. *Operations Research* 67(5):1246-1268.



Koopman Prize 2020

Is awarded to

**David Simchi-Levi, Nikolaos Trichakis, and
Peter Yun Zhang**

For their outstanding paper titled

"Designing Response Supply Chain Against Bioattacks"

Natalie M. Scala

Natalie M. Scala
President, MAS

Andrew Hall

Andrew Hall
Past President, MAS

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